Introduction
Mr Dunne is the central figure in concurrent bankruptcy proceedings in the United States of America and the Republic of Ireland (Eire). In South Africa the Irish official assignee of Dunne's Irish estate, Mr Lehane, applied to the courts for recognition and assistance. Progressing in stages through the Western Cape Division of the High Court, the Lehane matter arrived in the Supreme Court of Appeal. 1
After briefly stating the facts, this case comment moves on to Steyn J's provisional order in the Cape in September 2014 2 and places that judge's approach in the context of cross-border insolvency law. Soon the Lehane matter came before Yekiso J on the return date in October 2014, 3 and features of that judge's order are commented on as regards its scope in relation to section 21 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 and the restriction of the relief to creditors whose causes of action arose wholly in South Africa. Yekiso J delivered his reserved judgment in January 2015. 4 In November the Lehane matter reached the Supreme Court of Appeal, 5 where Leach JA gave the judgment of the court in December. Among the various aspects of Yekiso J's judgment 6 and Leach JA's, 7 this case comment focuses on twothe automatic stay under American law, and the standing of Lehane to seek relief from the South African courts; both aspects were dealt with convincingly by the courts. The discussion of these aspects is supplemented by references, in footnotes, to the decisions of the Irish High Court 8 and the Supreme Court of Ireland, 9 for the light that they throw on aspects of the Lehane matter. After some comments on further points of South African cross-border insolvency law regarding the concepts of submission to the jurisdiction of the foreign court and also the recognition of * Alastair Smith. BA, LLB (Rhodes), PhD (Edin). Professor, Department of Mercantile Law, School of Law, University of South Africa. E-mail: smithad@unisa.ac.za. The Lehane 2015 case.
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In the matter of Sean Dunne (a Bankrupt) 2015 IESC 42 (15 May 2015 . This court is the Irish court of final appeal (Supreme Court of Ireland 2016 http://tinyurl.com/guqp2xo).
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The automatic stay under American law
Quite some space in the judgments by Yekiso J and Leach JA was devoted to considering whether the American automatic stay applied to Lehane's South African application and thus prevented the application from being pursued. It is submitted that the key to understanding this aspect of the case was mentioned as early as the first paragraph of Yekiso J's judgment: "His trustee in the US supports these proceedings". 41 This aspect was identified 41 The as the central point by Leach JA in remarking on the co-operation between the American and Irish trustees and the fact that the automatic stay had been lifted in order to allow the Irish proceedings to go ahead. 42 Similarly, the American trustee gave his approval to the lifting of the automatic stay in respect of the South African application by Lehane. 43 So it is submitted that it is unnecessary to explore the implications of differences of opinion in the expert evidence led before the Cape court and the Supreme Court of Appeal about the relevance of the American automatic stay to the South African application. The American trustee did not appear before the South African courts in order to oppose the relief that Lehane sought before these courts; and it could be argued that it was not Lagoon's place to raise such an objection on behalf of the American trustee.
As Yekiso J observed, 44 in any event section 362 of the American Bankruptcy Code applied to an action regarding a fraudulent transfer and the South African application was not for this form of relief. Still, it is submitted that Leach JA deftly resolved this point by explaining that it was complicated. The present litigants were the debtor and a major creditor of the debtor, and it was important to note that the American trustee was not before the Supreme Court of Ireland (para 62). It is submitted that the relevance of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997) and its local adaptation may also be pondered. Part of the reasoning about the possible application of the automatic stay was based on the "… standard position … that the insolvent estate will fall into the jurisdiction of the first court which grants a sequestration order". 46 Sheldon was cited as authority. 47 Having dealt with the automatic stay, the discussion now turns to the standing of Lehane to apply to the South African court for recognition and assistance.
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The That cautious ruling and the possibility that it created in the Lehane matter were explored by Leach JA in more detail. He mentioned that recognition had been extended to trustees who had not been appointed by the domiciliary court. 59 The uncertainty over the domicile and the American court's enlistment of the Irish legal system were regarded as constituting the exceptional circumstances. 60 Leach JA warned that it was "not simply a matter of comity and convenience" 61 which justified the South African courts helping in the present case; the further aspect was that it was "… also intimately bound up with the prima facie case made out against Mr Dunne for his being domiciled in Ireland". The Lagoon case para 31.
60
The Lagoon case para 32.
61
The Lagoon case para 32. Berman J followed up this point by saying that the general principle concerning the recognition of foreign trustees was trite law. 64 O'Brien argued 65 that the Morris quotation was not authority for Berman J's ruling in Palmer on this point. Instead, the quotation concerned the orders that might automatically apply beyond the jurisdiction of the domiciliary court, without needing to be formally recognised. As O'Brien adds, it "does not follow that only orders made by the court of the insolvent's domicile may be recognised". 66 First, it is submitted that foreign insolvency representatives, not foreign sequestration or liquidation proceedings, are recognised. 67 Further, it is submitted that the possibility of recognising other foreign trustees is implied by the fact that in the Palmer case Berman J mentioned two possible exceptions to the general principle of recognising the domiciliary trustee. This submission would be consistent with O'Brien's observation.
62
The Palmer case 361I.
63
The Morris case 666.
64
The The first possible exception acknowledged by Berman J in the Palmer case was that recognition might be accorded if the insolvent had sought his sequestration in a country where he was not domiciled. Then his trusteeone infers, from that non-domiciliary jurisdiction -"… might … be able to obtain recognition in the country of the insolvent's domicile on the basis of the doctrine of submission". 68
This possibility was not discussed in detail in the Lehane matter, where Mr Dunne submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the American bankruptcy court by seeking bankruptcy under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The reason that this possibility was not discussed may be that it was not relevant to the South African facts. The basis on which this possible exception might apply would be that the United States was not Mr Dunne's domicile at the time of the Irish bankruptcy proceedings, and that, instead, Ireland was that domicile, and the American trustee was seeking recognition in the Irish court. Mr Dunne was not domiciled at the Cape. So in applying to the South African court for recognition and assistance, Lehane was not applying, on the basis of the doctrine of submission, for recognition in the country of the insolvent's domicile.
And how far does the authority relied on -the Richards case -in fact illustrate the principle for which it was cited in support of the first exception mentioned in the Palmer case? Doveton resided and was domiciled and had all his assets in the Cape Colony. He was not subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Griqualand. He gave his agent in Kimberley an ordinary general power of attorney. Process was served on that agent. The High Court of Griqualand gave judgment against Doveton and in July granted a compulsory sequestration order against his estate and appointed Richards as the trustee. A copy of the Griqualand sequestration was not sent to the Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope until December.
Meanwhile, in September the High Court of Griqualand confirmed Richards as the trustee of the Griqualand estate. In addition, in September Doveton, who knew of the Griqualand sequestration order, had applied to surrender his estate in the Cape Colony. The Cape court was not informed of the Griqualand sequestration or Richards's appointment in that jurisdiction. In October the Cape court confirmed the appointment of the Cape trustees of Doveton's estate.
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At no (prior) stage had the Cape court known of the Griqualand sequestration. Richards maintained that he did not know of the Cape proceedings, although they had been advertised. He applied to have the appointment of Doveton's Cape trustees set aside. The Griqualand power of attorney was not placed in evidence before the Cape court.
In a short judgment, De Villiers CJ held that Richards had to prove that these Cape orders had been mistakenly granted and that the Cape court was obliged to give effect to the Griqualand court's order. Richards argued that Doveton had granted the agent in Kimberley the power of attorney with the general power of representation. De Villiers CJ held 69 that Richards's argument would be sound if clearly the power of attorney was broad enough to entitle the agent to submit to the Griqualand court's jurisdiction. It had to be assumed that the relevant power of attorney was the standard one. The power of attorney would even be taken to confer on the general agent the power to accept service on the insolvent's behalf. Still, this power of attorney would not be broad enough for Richards's purposes, because
Yet in the Richards case, Doveton "never was amenable to the insolvency jurisdiction of the High Court" of Griqualand. 72 The Griqualand appointment of Richards did not prevent the Cape court from appointing local trustees to manage the Cape estate that Doveton had surrendered. So Richards's application failed.
Despite the conferring of the general power of attorney on the Kimberley agent, who received process there, it is noticeable that the Cape court, when belatedly informed of the pre-existing Griqualand court's sequestration order, did not recognise it. So the Richards case, on its facts, is not authority for the principle that a debtor may submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court and then the trustee appointed to the relevant insolvent estate may rely on the resulting sequestration order as a basis sufficient in 69
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A SMITH PER / PELJ 2016 (19) 15 a local court exercising jurisdiction over the debtor by virtue of his domicile and his property both being within the jurisdictional area of that local court.
From dealing with the first exception to the general principle, the discussion moves on to the second exception to the general principle regarding the recognition of foreign insolvency representatives.
5.2.2.3
The second exception: recognition of the non-domiciliary trustee in exceptional cases and for exceptional convenience
The second possible exception to the general principle that Berman J discussed in the Palmer case 73 was permitted by Innes CJ's cautious ruling in the Morris case. This second possibility was that the insolvent's domiciliary court might recognise a non-domiciliary trustee in exceptional cases and for exceptional convenience. Berman J mentioned three cases in this regard. These are now considered in turn. It is acknowledged that in broad terms Louwrens J did consider whether the Cape court could recognise the trustee. He decided against doing so. The principle that the application for recognition could be entertained can be deduced from the circumstances of the case; but, as far as the afteracquired movable property in the Cape was concerned, one infers that those circumstances were not so extraordinary as to render it appropriate for the Cape court to recognise the Transvaal trustee, who had been appointed so many years previously. The Natal court recognised the Transvaal trustee as being able to deal with the Natal movable property, 81 a decision not challenged on appeal. Again, when the Singer case is compared with the Herman case, it is clear that it was the non-domiciliary trustee from the Transvaal who was seeking recognition from the Natal court. So to that extent the decision bears out the principle that the non-domiciliary trustee may still be recognised by the court of the debtor's domicile, as regards movable property. But the outcome for the Transvaal trustee in the Singer case was different from the outcome for the Transvaal trustee in the Herman case. Although both the debtors were held to have acquired new domiciles in Herman and Singer, it is submitted that the point of distinction was the lapse of a considerable period of time in Herman.
Further, in the Singer case the Natal court also had to decide the position regarding the debtor's immovable property situated in Natal. In this respect, the appeal court in the Singer case (Bale CJ, Dove-Wilson J and Broome J) reached a decision different from the decision that had been reached regarding the Natal movable property. It was acknowledged that the Natal court exercised jurisdiction over this immovable property. As regards whether the Natal court should in comity recognise the Transvaal trustee, the court followed the decision of the Transvaal Supreme Court in Ex parte Stegmann. 82 The appeal court in the Singer case declined to set aside the decision reached by Beaumont J in the exercise of his discretion. The appeal court gave various reasons (including the finding that Skeen had been domiciled in Natal and not the Transvaal) why it would be convenient for the immovable property to be dealt with in Natal. 83 In the Palmer case, 84 Berman J held that comity and convenience were not a separate ground for a South African court to recognise a foreign trustee "regardless of any consideration given to the" domicile of the insolvent. This factor explains why Leach JA referred to Lehane's prima facie case establishing Mr Dunne's Irish domicile. 85 However, as the Rhodesian case of M T D (Mangula) and the old Natal case of Singer show (at least in relation to the movable property in the Singer case), recognition may be accorded if the non-domiciliary foreign representative does apply to the local court for such recognition. The lack of proof of the required domicile may not be fatal to the success of the application. But it appears that the application by the non-domiciliary trustee for recognition must be prompt, otherwise this trustee faces the obstacle of another rule of cross-border insolvency law, that property acquired after the insolvent has acquired a new domicile of choice does not vest in the trustee appointed in his previous domicile. 86 If this conclusion is correct, then domicile is seen to continue to play a decisive role in the decision whether to recognise and assist a foreign insolvency representative.
Conclusion
This case comment has discussed some aspects of the relief that South African courts are prepared to grant to foreign representatives. These parties seek the required recognition so as to be allowed to deal with South African assets. The terms of the relief granted to the foreign insolvency representative in the Lehane matter are wide, opening up the possible application of section 21 of the Insolvency Act to the facts, an outcome that would greatly assist a foreign trustee such as Lehane if he sought to convince the South African court that the insolvent spouse's transfer of property to the solvent spouse was an invalid donation at the time that it was made.
At the same time, the territorial nature of the South African order in Lehane is observed by its restricting the claims of creditors to those whose whole 84 The Palmer case 365C.
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The Herman case. This principle regarding property acquired in a new domicile of choice may also be seen in operation in the Morris case, where the debtor had creditors and immovable property in Rhodesia but had moved to the Transvaal and acquired a domicile and movable property in that state; and it was held that although a non-domiciliary trustee could be recognised, the court in its discretion should on the balance of convenience not recognise and assist the Rhodesian trustee in the circumstances of the case.
A SMITH PER / PELJ 2016 (19) 19 cause of action arose in South Africa. This paragraph of the order rules out the possibility of cross-filing by a creditor with a foreign cause of action who wishes to claim for the amount, or the balance, of a claim made in a foreign jurisdiction. This cross-filing would not be allowed even to a creditor from the debtor's domicile, whether the United States or the Republic of Ireland, in the Lehane matter. It follows that this paragraph of the Cape court order would also rule out the claim of a South African creditor whose whole cause of action had not arisen in South Africa.
The finding that the automatic stay conferred by the relevant provision of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States did not apply in South Africa was correct. Yet the significance of the question was seen to wane when on appeal it was pointed out that the American and the Irish trustees were collaborating. The American trustee's approval of the South African proceedings constituted a further lifting of the American worldwide automatic stay, even supposing that it did apply to the type of proceedings undertaken by Lehane in South Africa.
The question of Mr Dunne's domicile was dealt with on the basis that this was in Ireland rather than America. This was the finding of Yekiso J, who did not explore the question of whether recognition might still be accorded to Lehane if Mr Dunne were domiciled in America. Instead, this aspect was discussed more thoroughly by Leach JA in the light of the conflicting statements over the domicile of Mr Dunne, although the judge similarly concluded that on the facts Mr Dunne had retained his Irish domicile and not acquired a new domicile in America. Even as regards the recognition of a non-domiciliary trustee, the question of the domicile of the debtor is seen to be an important factor, as the discussion of the cases with respect to the two exceptions mentioned in the Palmer case shows. 
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